Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law by Keedy, Edwin Roulette
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1908
Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law
Edwin Roulette Keedy
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keedy, Edwin Roulette, "Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law" (1908). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 2052.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2052
HARVARD
LAW REVIEW.
VOL. XXII. DECEMBER, 1908. NO. 2.
IGNORANCE AND MISTAKE IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW.
I.
N the early days of English jurisprudence, maxims were regarded
as inflexible and comprehensive rules of law to be strictly
applied without regard to the reasons upon which they were
based.' Modern courts and text-writers, however, attach much
less importance to maxims;2 for the experience of centuries has
proved the inapplicability of maxims in many instances and their
too extensive scope in others. As pointed out in an article by
Professor Jeremiah Smith,3 there is much necessary difficulty
in applying a maxim on account of its brevity and the fact that
it is couched in a foreign language. Moreover, there is nothing
in a maxim to indicate. when it is to be applied. Although
maxims vary in value and force,4 they may in most instances be re-
garded as but trite and brief statements of legal principles, which
principles have become established by reason and custom. Diffi-
culty arises when the maxim is treated as the principle rather than
the statement of the principle. The degree of accuracy with which
1 "The fourth ground of the law of England standeth in divers principles that be
called in the law maxims, the which have been always taken for law in this realm; so
that it is not lawful for any that is learned to deny them; for every one of those
maxims is sufficient authority to himself." Doc. & Stud., Dial. I, c. 8.
"A maxime is a proposition to be of all men confessed and granted without proofe,
argument, or discourse." Co. Lit. 67 a.
2 ", It seems to me that legal maxims in general are little more than pert headings
of chapters." 2 Stephen, Hist. Crim. Law, 94, note r.
"I need hardly repeat that I detest the attempt to fetter the law by maxims. They
are almost invariably misleading; they are for the most part so large and general in
their language that they always include something which really is not intended to be
included in them." Lord Esher, M. R. in Yarmouth v. France, i9 Q. B. D. 647, 653.
S 9 HARV. L. REv. 13. 4 Ibid.
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the statement fits the principle determines the value of the maxim.
Consequently, when a body of law has grown up around a maxim,
it is desirable to ascertain the extent to which the decisions are
based upon legal reasoning and analogy, and the extent to which
they have been influenced by the maxim as such.
Ignorantiajuris non excusat, ignorantiafacti excusat1 is a maxim
familiar to the layman as well as to the lawyer. The purpose of
this article is to discuss the origin of this maxim; to consider the
scope of its influence in criminal jurisprudence; 2 to discover the
extent to which the decisions referring to it are founded upon
general principles; and finally to determine what is the state of
the law to-day regarding ignorantia juris and ignorantia facti as
defenses to criminal prosecutions. In order to do this with some
degree of clearness it is necessary to define terms.
In the application of the maxim the word "ignorantia" has
been translated as "ignorance" and as " mistake"; and these
terms have generally been used interchangeably.3 It should be
noted, however, that the two English words convey different ideas,
which difference has been recognized in some instances.4 " Igno-
rance" may be defined as lack of knowledge; whereas a" mistake"
is a wrong conclusion frequently caused by insufficient knowledge. 5
Whether the criminality of a defendant is greater or less because
his act is due to one rather than to the other of these will be
discussed later.
1 The maxim appears in various wordings. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat:
Lush, J. in Reg. v. Mayor of Tewkesbury, 3 Q. B. 629, 639. Ignorantia eoram, quae
quis scire tenetur, non excusat : i Hale P. C. 42. Ignorantia excusatur, non juris sed
facti: 2 Bouvier, Law Dict. 355. Ignorantiajuris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem
excusat: 4 Bi. Com. 27. Ignorantia juis haud excusat. Cooper, v. Phibbs, L. R.
2 H. L. 149, 170.
2 The application of the maxim in civil cases has been fully discussed and con-
sidered. See 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur., §§ 838-87 ; 7 Colum. L. Rev. 476; 6 Albany L. J.
103; 17 Cent. L. J. 422; 27 L. Mag. 9o.
8 Bishop, New Crim. Law, § 292 et sey.; 4 Bl. Com. 27. The examples given in
D. 22. 6. 9. support the use indicated. Austin treats ignorantia as meaning error or
ignorance. Austin, Jur., § 688.
4 "Mistake may be said to be some unintentional act, omission or error arising
from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence."
Kerr, Fraud and Mistake, 396. See Story, Eq. Jur., § 11o and § 14o, note 2, citing Canal
Bank v. Bank of Albany, x Hill (N. Y.) 287. "The terms 'ignorance' and' mistake,' in
legal contemplation, do not import the same significance and should not be confounded.
Ignorance implies a total want of knowledge in reference to the subject matter. Mis-
take admits a knowledge, but implies a wrong conclusion." Hutton v. Edgerton,
6 S. C. 485, 489. See also 17 Cent. L. J. 22.
5 Hutton v. Edgerton, 6 S. C. 485: 41so.
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"Law," which is regarded as the English equivalent of "jus,"
may be defined as a rule or standard of conduct which has been
prescribed by competent authority, and which it is the duty of a
judicial tribunal to apply and enforce.' " The inquiry whether
there be any such rule or standard, the determination of the exact
meaning and scope of it, the definition of its terms, and the settle-
ment of incidental questions, such as the conformity of it, in the
mode of its enactment, with the requirements of a written consti-
tution, are all naturally and justly classed together and allotted
to the same tribunal; and these are called questions of law."12
"Facts" are natural phenomena, which are the subject of testi-
mony, and to which the law is applied by or under the direction
of a judicial tribunal.3
A question as to the application of law to facts is a question of
law.4 Thus, whether a man and a woman are married is a question
of law, since the status is determined by the application of the law
of marriage to the conduct of the parties. Consequently, where a
mistake is made in applying law to fact, the mistake is one of law.5
In such cases " the law is either extended to things which it was
not intended to govern, or a fact is improperly withdrawn from its
domain. In either case there is really an error as to the purport
and scope of the law." 6
Blackstone says that the maxim as to ignorantia is a rule of both
the Roman and the English law; 7 and it is universally accepted
that the doctrine is of Roman origin.3 In the Digest 9 the rule
is stated, jumis quidam ignorantiam cuique nocere, facti vero igno-
rantiam non nocere, and our maxim ignorantia juris non excusat,
ignorantiafacti excusat is treated as the equivalent' The context
and the examples given in the Digest, to illustrate the maxim, show
that it was applied solely to civil actions and had no application in
1 See Thayer, Prel. Treat. on Ev., 192 ; Davis v. Ballard, 24 Ky. 563, 576.
2 Thayer, Prel. Treat. on Ev., 193.
8 See Thayer, Prel. Treat. on Ev., igo-igz. See also Barr v. Chicago, St. L. and
P. R. R. Co, xo Ind. App. 433, 437-
4 Thayer, Prel. Treat. on Ev., 252. Goudsmit, Pandects (Gould's translation), § 52 n.
5 Cf. Dixon, C. J., in Hurd v. Hall, 12 Wis. 125, 138.
6 Goudsmit, Pandects (Gould's translation), § 52 n.
7 4 Com. 27.
8 3 Greenleaf, Ev., x6 ed., § 20.
9 D. 22. 6. 9.
10 ,, Regula est, juris ignorantiam euigue nocere is the language of the Pandects.
Ignorantia juris non excusat is the maxim of the common law." Kerr, Fraud and
Mistake, 396.
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the law of crimes. Writers on the Roman Law treat the doctrine
of ignorantia set forth in the Digest as applicable solely in the law
of civil actions.' The reason given in the Digest, why ignorantia
juris will not excuse, while ignorantia facti will, is that the law is
certain and capable of being ascertained, while the construction of
facts is difficult for even the most circumspect 2  Under modern
conditions, at least, it would hardly be seriously maintained that
the former reason is sound.3
In the English law the earliest case found, in which the doctrine
of ignorantia is considered, was decided in Hilary Term, 123I.
In this case Robert Waggehastr' was summoned to answer one
Wakelinus for breach of a fine committed by entering upon the
land in question, which was in the possession of the mother of
Wakelinus. Robert pleaded as a defense that he entered upon the
land under the belief that the estate belonged to him, which belief
was founded upon the advice of counsel. The court held that this
was no defense, and ordered Robert to be imprisoned for breach
of the fine.
Other cases illustrating the early use of the maxim, and show-
ing the development of the doctrine of ignorantia, are worthy of
notice.
Vernon's Case, decided in 15o5, was an action of trespass
brought against the defendants for carrying off the plaintiff's wife.
The defendants justified on the ground that they were accompany-
ing the woman to Westminster to sue for a divorce to ease her
conscience. Objection was made to the plea on the ground that
Westminster was not the proper place to take the woman for a
divorce, but the plea was held good, "for perhaps they did not
have knowledge of the law as to where the divorce should be
sued." 6
The Doctor and Student Dialogues,7 published in 1518, state
the following rule: "Ignorance of the law (though it be invin-
I Hunter, Roman Law, 3 ed, 66o; Domat, Civil Law, §§ Z224-r240; Amos, Roman
Civil Law, 133 ; Curwin, Manual of Civil Law, 2 ed., u s i ; Goudsmit, Pandects (Gould's
translation), § 52; Sandar, Institutes of Justinian, 388.
2 D. 22. 6. 2.
8 " That any actual system is so knowable, or that any actual system has ever been
so knowable, is so notoriously and ridiculously false that I shall not occupy your time
with proof of the contrary." Austin, Jur., § 688.
4 Reported in Bracton's Note Book, Maitland's ed., pl. 496.
- V. B., 2o Hen. VII, f. 2, pl. 4.
6 " Car par cas ils n'avoift conusance de le Ley on le divorsce seroit sue.'
7 Dial. II., c. 46.
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cible) doth not excuse as to the law but in a few cases; for every
man is bound at his peril to take knowledge what the law of the
realm is, as well the law made by statute as the common law; but
ignorance of the deed, which may be called the ignorance of the
truth of the deed, may excuse in many cases." The doctrine was
regarded as applicable in both civil and criminal cases.
In Brett v. Rigden, 1 1568, a case involving the construction of a
deed, Manwood, J., said: "It is to be presumed that no subject
of this realm is miscognisant of the law whereby he is governed.
Ignorance of the law excuses no one."
In Mildmay's Case,2 1584, an action was brought against the
defendant for slandering the plaintiff's title, by stating that the
title to the land was in some other person. The court held that,
as the defendant had taken upon him a knowledge of the law, he
must be bound, as "ignorantiafuiiis non excusat."
In Manser's Case,3 1584, an action of debt was brought against
the defendant. It appeared in evidence that, by the terms of an
agreement between the parties, the defendant and his son were to
sign a certain release to the plaintiff. This release was prepared
by the plaintiff, who then demanded that the defendant and his
son sign the same. "Because his son was not lettered and could
not read, the said John prayed the plaintiff to deliver it to him, to
be showed to some man learned in the law, who might inform him
if it was according to the condition." This the plaintiff refused to
do, and brought action. The court decided that the son was not
entitled to time to consult counsel, but should have signed the re-
lease at once. "Ignorantia est duplex, viz. facti etjuris. Ignorantia
ftris non excusat."
King v. Lord Vaux, 4 1613. An indictment was brought against
the defendant for refusing to take the oath of allegiance. The de-
fendant, when arraigned, desired counsel to speak for him, "he
being very ignorant of the proceedings of the Lawes of this Land."
Hubbert, the Attorney-General, replied to this, "that there was no
need of Councell for to be assigned to him in this case, for though
he do pretend ignorance in himself in the laws of the Land (of
which no Subject of the Land ought to be ignorant), for that his
ignorance of the law will not excuse him, if so be that he do offend
against the law." The court concurred in this view.
In Levett's Case,5 1638, the defendant, under the mistaken belief
1 1 Plowd. 342.
4 1 Bulst. 197.
2 z Co. Rep. 175.
S Cro. Car. 538.
8 2 Co. Rep. 3.
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that there were burglars in his house, killed a woman of whose
presence he was ignorant. The court held that the defendant was
not guilty of manslaughter, "for he did it ignorantly without inten-
tion of hurt to the said Frances."
Sir Matthew Hale, in his Pleas of the Crown,' published in i68o,
said: "Ignorance of the municipal law of the kingdom, or of the
penalty thereby inflicted upon offenders, doth not excuse any that
is of the age of discretion and compos mentis from the penalty of
the breach of it; because every person of the age of discretion
and compos mentis is bound to know the law, and presumed so to
do; Ignorantia eortm quae quis scire tenetur non excusat. But in
some cases ignorantia facti doth excuse, for such an ignorance
many times makes the act itself morally involuntary." This may
well be considered as the basic statement of the law of Eng-
land as to ignorantia, and is generally cited as a leading authority
for the present law on the subject.2
It is interesting to observe how the scope of the maxim, as indi-
cated in the Doctor and Student Dialogues, differs from that set
forth in the Corpus 5Yuris Civilis. By the Roman Law the rule as
to ignorantia juris did not apply to certain classes of individuals,3
because it was considered that these individuals, by reason of their
status or condition, would not have a knowledge of the law. Those
exempted were persons under twenty-five years,4 women,5 soldiers,6
and peasants and other persons of small intelligenceY Austin points
out that these persons were not exempt where their ignorance was
as to some portion of thejus gentium as distinguished from thejus
civile. "For the persons in question are not generally imbecile,
and the jus gentium is knowable nzaturali ratione. With regard to
thejus civile or to those parts of the Roman Law which are pecul-
iar to the system, they may allege with effect their ignorance of
the law." 8
In the Doctor and Student Dialogues it is expressly stated that
infants cannot avail themselves of ignorance as a defense. 9 It is
likewise stated that "knights and noblemen that are bound most
properly to set their study to acts of chivalry for defense of the
realm, and husbandmen that must use tillage and husbandry for
I 1 Hale, P. C. 42.
2 See Broom, Legal Maxims, 7 ed., 266; Wharton, Crim. Ev., § 723.
8 Quibusjus ignorarepermissum est. D. 22. 6. 9.
4 D. 22. 6.9. 5 D. 22.6.9. D. 22.6. 9.z.
7 D. 49. 14. 2. 7. 8 Austin, Jur., § 693. 9 Dial. IL c. 46.
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the sustenance of the commonalty, and that may not by reason of
their labor put themselves to know the law," are not discharged
by ignorance of the law.'
By the Digest 2 it is indicated that one, who has had no oppor-
tunity to consult counsel, should be excused for ignorance, but, it
is said in the Dialogues,3 that if one acts on the improper advice
of counsel, this does not constitute a defense.
II. IGNORANCE AND MISTAKE OF FACT.
It is a fundamental principle of the criminal law, for which no
authorities need be cited, that the doer of a criminal act shall not
be punished unless he has a criminal mind. An exception to this
exists in a case where, by statute, the legislature either expressly
or impliedly indicates that no such state of mind is necessary.
Some offenses require a specific intent -a special state of mind
which is an essential element of the criminal act. Thus the crime
of larceny is not committed unless the defendant has the animus
furandi.
Whenever a person, having the ability of reasoning to a conclu-
sion,4 does a criminal act, he has the criminal mind. In order that
one may be able to reason to a conclusion, he must have the power
or capacity of reasoning, and the data upon which to base the
reasoning. There must be a process and the materials upon which
the process can operate. A defect in the process or in the materi-
als will affect the result.
Whenever, then, the defendant does not have the ability to reason
as considered above, he does not have the criminal mind. Infants
under seven and lunatics are exempted from criminal responsibility,
because they have not the power of reasoning. One who commits
a criminal act under mistake of fact has a defense, because he has
wrong or insufficient data for reasoning.
5
1 Dial. II. c. 46. 2 D. 22. 6. 9. 3 Dial. I. c. 26.
4 The word "voluntarily" is usually employed in this connection, but as the term is
capable of somewhat varying meanings, it was in this instance thought wise to express
the idea in full.
1" Doing the act voluntarily is evidence of the unlawful intent, and no other is requi.
site." Clopton, J., in Mullens v. State, 82 Ala. 42.
5 " But in some cases (gnorantiafacti doth excuse, for such an ignorance many times
makes the act itself morally involuntary." I Hale, P. C. 42.
"The act ofthe insane person was not ' voluntary'; it was impelled by disease. Neither
was the act of the woman marrying under mistake 'voluntary'; it was impelled by the
6
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The defendant's criminality must be determined by his state of
mind toward the situation in which he acted, and his state of mind
will depend upon his impression of the facts. Hence he should
be dealt with as if the facts were what he believed them to be.
Then if, according to his belief concerning the facts, his act is crim-
inal, he has the criminal mind as distinguished from motive, desire,
or intention, and should be punished. If, on the other hand, his
act would be innocent provided the facts were what he believed
them to be, he does not have the criminal mind, and consequently
should not be punished for his act.
Ignorance and mistake of fact,' therefore, are important in so far
as they negative the criminal mind.2
There is no saving power in mistake itself. The fact that defen-
dant says "I was mistaken " does not necessarily indicate that he
is not guilty. It is only by showing the absence of the criminal
mind due to his mistake that he can escape punishment for his
criminal act. It follows that the mistake is no defense, where
there is a prosecution under a statute, in which the legislature has
indicated that no criminal mind is necessary for a conviction of
the crime created by the statute.3
mistake. This is so even in civil affairs; for if one enters into a contract through
mistake of fact, there is no 'voluntary' concord of minds, and the formal undertaking
is not binding." Joel Prentiss Bishop in 4 So. L. Rev. (N. s.) 153.
"Honest and reasonable mistake stands in fact on the same footinz as absence of
the reasoning faculty, as in infancy, or perversion of that faculty, as in lunacy." CaveJ..
in Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168.
1 There is no difference in result between ignorance of fact and mistake of fact. If
the defendant is unaware of the existence of a fact, he reasons without reference to that
fact, and hence he should be treated as if the fact did not exist. When the defendant
has a mistaken view of a fact, he reasons with reference to this view, and his responsi-
bility must be tested in the light of his belief. In either case the defendant has a
wrong impression of the situation in which he acts.
2 In Levett's Case, Cro. Car. 538, the court, in holding that the defendant would not
be guilty of manslaughter where he acted in ignorance of a material fact, said "for he
did it ignorantly without intention of hurt to the said Frances."
"Now here, although the proximate ground is ignorance or error, the ultimate
ground is the absence of unlawful intention or unlawful inadvertence." Austin, Jur.,
§ 687.
8 Reg. v. Bishop, 5 Q. B. D. 259; Com. v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6; Garver v. Oklahoma,
49 Pac. 470; State v. Kelly, 54 Oh. St. x66. Except where the legislature expressly
or impliedly indicates in a statute that no criminal mind is necessary, the existence of
such mind is indispensable to the securing of a conviction under the statute. Reg. V.
Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168; State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390. In the article by Mr. Bishop,
cited supra, he denies that the legislature ever dispenses with the requirement of crimi-
nal mind, and criticizes the cases where the defendant was held liable under a statute
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In the following instances, in which the mistake does not nega-
tive the criminal mind, the defendant has no defense:
I. Though the defendant is mistaken, the act done is criminal
under the facts as believed by him.'
II. The defendant, while engaged in the commission of one
criminal act, does another criminal act under ignorance or mistake
of fact.2 Here the criminal mind is carried over from the first act.
III. Where an act, itself immoral, is made a crime by statute
when done under certain circumstances, it has been held that
mistake as to the circumstances will not excuse one who does the
act covered by the statute. There is some confusion among the
authorities as to whether this result is reached, because under such
a statute no criminal mind is necessary, or because the immoral
intent will under the circumstances establish the culpability.3
IV. Defendant was negligent. Though it is not correct to say
that negligence is the same as intent, yet negligence supplies
for selling adulterated food not knowing of the adulteration, claiming that the crimi-
nal mind should be proved in such cases.
Where the act covered by the statute is in the nature of a public tort rather than of a
crime, it would seem clear that no criminal mind need to be proved.
In Com. v. Mash, 7 Met. (Mass.) 472, a woman was indicted for bigamy. The defend-
ant married the second time under the mistaken belief that her former husband was
dead. This was held to be no defense on the ground that no criminal mind was ne-
cessary in order to secure a conviction under the statute. A similar result was reached
in Com.v. Thompson, ii Allen 23. These cases are criticized in 4 So. L. Rev. (N. S.)
153.
In England there is an interesting series of nisipriuts cases in which a mistaken be-
lief in the death of the husband was set up as a defense to a prosecution of the wife
for bigamy. Martin, B., in Reg. v. Turner, 9 Cox C. C. i45, and Cleasby, B., in Reg. v.
Horton, ii Cox C. C. 67o, held that the mistake was a good defense. In Reg. v. Gib-
bons, 12 Cox C. C. 237, Brett, J., after consulting with Willes, J., decided, that the
result in the two preceding cases was incorrect, and instructed the jury that the mis-
take was no defense. Denman, J., in Reg. v. Moore, 13 Cox C. C. 544, discussed the
three preceding cases and said that he preferred the view of the first two. In Reg. v.
Bennett, 14 Cox C. C. 45, Bramwell, L. J., followed Reg. v. Gibbons, instructing the
jury to convict notwithstanding the mistake.
1 Reg. v. Lynch, i Cox C. C. 361; McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772; Reg. v. Smith,
Dears. C. C. 559. In these three cases the defendant assaulted the prosecuting witness
under the belief that he was another person.
2 " If A meaning to steale a Deere in the Park of B shooteth at the Deer, and by the
glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a bush ; this is murder for that the
act was unlawful, although A had no intention to hurt the boy, nor knew not of him."
3 Co. Inst. 56.
See article on " Crimes by Mistake" in 21 Ir. L. T. 213.
3 In Com. v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, and State v. Newton, 44 Ia. 45, where statutes
made it a criminal offense to have intercourse with any girl under a certain age, it was
held that mistake as to the girl's age would be no defense, as no criminal mind was
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the place of intent, and, like intent, makes the mind criminal.
Hence, if the defendant is negligent a mistake will not excuse, for
mistake is material only as it negatives a criminal mind, and here
this is shown aliunde.2
The defendant's mind is equally criminal when he does a
criminal act through negligence or when the mistake under which
the defendant acted was due to negligence. Therefore a negligent
mistake can be no defense.
The statement is often made by judges and commentators that a
mistake of fact, in order to avail as a defense, must be "honest and
reasonable." 3 "Honest" in this connection can only mean that
the defendant did in truth believe the facts to be different from
what they were. It is, therefore, a truism to say that the mistake
must be honest.
Must the mistake be reasonable? An act is reasonable in law
when it is such as a man of ordinary care, skill, and prudence would
do under similar circumstances. To require that the mistake be
reasonable means that if the defendant is to have a defense, he
must have acted up to the standard of an average man, whether the
defendant is himself such a man or not. This is the application of
an outer standard to the individual. If the defendant, being mis-
taken as to material facts, is to be punished because his mistake is
one which an average man would not make, punishment will some-
times be inflicted when the criminal mind does not exist. Such a
result is contrary to fundamental principles, and is plainly unjust,
for a man should not be held criminal because of lack of intel-
ligence. If the mistake, whether reasonable or unreasonable, as
necessary under the statutes in question. In Reg. v. Prince, L. R. 2 C. C. 154, a statute
made it an offense to take a girl under fourteen years out of the lawful possession of
her father. The defendant did this, believing the girl to be over fourteen years. The
court expressly admitted that the criminal mind was necessary, but said the defendant
acted at his own risk. In Lawrence v. Com., 30 Grat. (Va.) 845, a statute made it
criminal to have intercourse with a girl under twelve years. The court held that it was
no defense that the defendant believed the girl to be older, as he acted at his peril. In
State v. Houx, lO9 Mo. 654, the defendant was indicted under a statute for having in-
tercourse with a girl under a certain age. Here the court in holding conviction proper
said that mistake as to the girl's age was no defense, as the immoral intent supplied the
place of the criminal intent.
1 I Foster, C. L. 262; Com. v. Rodes, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 171; Rex v. Pittwood, i9
T. L. R. 37; Reg. v. Lowe, 3 C. & K. 123.
2 Bishop says, there is "little difference except in degree between a will to do a wrong-
ful thing and an indifference whether it is done or not." New Crim. Law, § 313.
3 Cave, J., in Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. x68, i8o; Kenny, Outlines Crim. Law, Am.
Ed. 6o.
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judged by an external standard, does negative the criminal mind,
there should be no conviction.
The requirement, that the mistake be reasonable in order to be a
defense, at first sight appears the same as the rule that if the
defendant be negligent his mistake will not avail. This similarity,
however, is only seeming, for the test of negligence in the criminal
law is not whether the defendant used the care of a reasonable man
-an outer standard-but whether he used the care which ap-
peared proper to him under the circumstances, that is " Did he do
his best according to his own lights? "1 In other words, the test
is: Did the defendant act up to his own standard? 2
An examination of the authorities shows that the courts often
say (not infrequently without consideration) that the mistake must
be reasonable.3 In some cases the question is discussed and the
judges distinctly lay down the same proposition. 4 In other cases
" reasonableness" is not mentioned, and an " honest mistake" is
stated to be sufficient.5
I See 12 HARv. L. REv. 428.
2 Reg. v. Wagstaffe, 2o Cox C. C. 530. See Reg. v. Downes, i Q. B. D. 25; 12
HARV. L. REV. 428; 15 ibid. 500; 17 ibid. 347. There is a dictum in Com. v. Pierce,
138 Mass. 165, 178, to the effect that the care of a reasonable prudent man under simi-
lar circumstances should be the test in criminal as well as in civil cases.
3 Steinmyer v. People, 95 Ill. 383; Rineman v. State, 24 Ind. So; Com. v. Power, 7
Met. (Mass.) 596; Com. v. Presby, 14 Gray (Mass.) 65; People v. Welch, 72 Mich.
548.
4 Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308; Stem v. State, 53 Ga. 229; Goetz v,. State, 41 Ind.
162; Mulreedv. State, 107 Ind. 62.
6 Vaughan v. State, 83 Ala. 55; Myers v. State, x Conn. 5o2; Baker v. State, 17 Fla.
4o6; Causey v. State, 79 Ga. 564; Brown v. State, 24 Ind. 113; State v. Barrackmore,
47 Ia. 684; Com. v. Wood, irI Mass. 408.
In Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. 141, the court says the mistake must be "without fault or
carelessness." This seems to be the proper view.
The question whether a mistake of fact must be reasonable is important when self-
defense is set up as an excuse. In such a case the defendant seeks to escape liability,
not because some element of guilt is lacking, but because be claims an excuse. It is
held that a defendant may avail himself of this defense when he acted under a mis-
taken apprehension of serious bodily harm.
Here it may be held that the mistake must be reasonable ; for the defendant does not
offer the mistake as negativing the criminal mind; but admitting this maintains that the
state, because of circumstances, should not punish him. Since he asks to be forgiven
when admittedly he had a criminal mind, it may not be improper to hold him to an ex-
ternal standard.
B;;hop, however, claims that the test of the mistake in such cases should be "without
fault or carelessness," rather than "reasonable." New Crim. Law, § 305. 2.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Grainger v. State, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 459, held that
if a man through cowardice, without reasonable grounds, believes himself in danger of
serious bodily injury he may kill. The doctrine of this case is expressly repudiated in
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Where the defendant claims to escape criminal liability because
he acted under a mistake of fact, there seems to arise, according to
some judges, a question as to the burden of proof: whether it is
upon the defendant to establish the mistake, or upon the prosecu-
tion to disprove the mistake, after it has been set up by the defend-
ant. Although it is not necessary for the prosecution to aver the
general criminal intent in the indictment,' yet, since the defendant's
culpability depends upon such intent, its existence is an essential
part of the prosecution's case, and must be proved when questioned
by the defendant. Since the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all the elements of the defendant's guilt,2 there
can be no conviction, when the defendant succeeds in creating a
reasonable doubt.8 Hence, when the defendant has produced
enough evidence of mistake to cast a reasonable doubt upon the
existence of the criminal mind, the prosecution should not succeed
unless it removes this doubt by disproving the mistake, or by
showing that the mistake, under the circumstances of the case, did
not negative the criminal mind. The burden to prove the defend-
ant's guilt, which is upon the prosecution at the start, does not
shift.4
Some courts have held, however, that the defendant has the
burden of proving that he was mistaken.5
Shorter v. People, 2 Comst. (N. Y.) x93, and most cases hold that the defendant may
excusably kill only when his mistaken apprehension is reasonable.
1 Com. v. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 173; Beale, Crim. P1. & Prac. § i35; Bishop,
Crim. Proced., §§ 278-281.
2 Starkie, Ev., 865; Beale, Crim. Pl. & Prac., § 292; x Bishop, Crim. Proced., § 818;
Castle v. State, 75 Ind. 146.
8 Beale, Crim. P1. & Prac., § 289; Thayer, Prel. Treat. Ev., 362, 363; Shaw, J., in
Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 320.
4 Com. v. Kimball, 41 Mass. 366; U. S. v. Gooding, 25 U. S.46o; Dubrose v'. State,
io Tex. App. 230.
When the defendant sets up alibi as defense, he denies one of the essentials of
guilt, viz., that he was present at the fact. In such a case the defendant need not prove
his absence, but the prosecution must prove his presence. Beale, Crim. P1. & Prac.,
§ 289; Wigmore, Ev., § 2512, and note containing collection of authorities.
Such defenses as mistake and alibi, each of which denies one of the elements of
guilt, must not in this connection be confounded with defenses of an affirmative char-
acter under which the defendant admits the commission of the crime but claims exemp-
tion from punishment because of some excusing fact, such as self-defense. In such
cases, though the evidence would be admissible under the general plea of not guilty,
nevertheless, the defense in its essence is by way of confession and avoidance, and the
defendant may properly be required to establish such defense. Beale, Crim. Pl. &
Prac., § 291. The courts disagree as to the extent of the defendant's burden. See
Wigmore, Ev., § 2512, n.
6 Marshall v. State, 49 Ala. 21; Bain v. State, 61 Ala. 75; Goetz v. State, 41 Ind.
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A ground of defense that may appropriately be considered under
the present title is "insane delusion." This may be defined as an
unreasoning belief in non-existent facts, which belief is persistent
and ineradicable, continuing notwithstanding evidence of the senses
to the contrary.
1
In M'Naghten's Case 2 the fourth question put by the House of
Lords to the judges was: "If a person under an insane delusion
as to existing facts commits an offense in consequence thereof, is
he thereby excused?" To which the judges replied: "Making the
assumption that he labors under such partial delusions only and is
not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the
same situation as to responsibility, as if the facts with respect to
which the delusion exists were real." This lays down the same test
for insane delusion as for ordinary mistake of fact. This is a satis-
factory test in cases where if the delusion were true the act done
would be no crime. The criminal mind is as much negatived
where the impressions are pure fictions of a disordered brain
as where the impressions differ but partly from the facts as they
really exist. The decisions are in accord with this view.
3
There is, however, reason for questioning whether the converse
of the above should hold; that is, whether the defendant should
necessarily be punished when the act done would be criminal if
the facts were as they appeared in the delusion to be. For ex-
ample, take the case of a defendant who believed that another man
had stolen his watch, and, acting under this delusion, killed the
man. By the test of the judges there would be no defense in such
a case, and this would be correct under the assumption made by
the judges. The correctness of the test, therefore, depends upon
the validity of the assumption that a man may act under an insane
delusion and be perfectly sane in all other respects. Writers on
medical jurisprudence strenuously deny that a man suffering from
an insane delusion can be sane in all other particulars. 4 Accord-
162; Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459. On the strength of these four cases Bishop states
the rule to be that "the burden of proof is on the party setting up the mistake to show
it and its innocence." New Crim. Law, § 302. 3. Further cases in accord with this
view are Farbach v. State, 24 Ind. 77; State v. Brown, 16 Pac. 259 (Kan.) (semIble).
1 See Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, 116, 117 ; Bundy v. McKnight, 48 Ind. 502,
512; In re White, 121 N. Y. 4o6, 413; Guiteau's Case, io Fed. z61, 17r.
2 so Cl. & F. 200.
3 Com. v. Rogers, 7 Met. (Mass.) 5oo; Guiteau's Case, io Fed. 161; Smith v. State,
55 Ark. 259.
4 "There is not, and there never has been, a person who labors under partial delu-
sion, and is not in other respects insane." Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, 174. To
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ing to this latter view the delusion, though immaterial as a mistake,
is strong evidence of general derangement which may exempt the
defendant from responsibility.'
From this it follows that, in considering whether the defendant
shall be convicted when he did a criminal act under an insane de-
lusion, the dual character of delusion, as mistake and as a symptom
of insanity, must be carefully borne in mind. This has been over-
looked by some judges and writers on the subject, and the test of
mistake is applied to delusion under the assumption that the de-
fendant is in all other respects sane.2
In order that the defendant may escape criminal liability because
he acted under an insane delusion it is clear that the standard of an
ordinary, reasonable man cannot be applied, because the definition
of delusion indicates that the belief of the defendant is not in
accord with the impression which would ordinarily be obtained
from the situation by the use of the senses. A man acting under
an insane delusion is not an average, reasonable man. This seems
to illustrate further the contention that a mistake of fact need not
necessarily be reasonable in order to be a good defense.
III. IGNORANCE AND MISTAKE OF LAW.
The courts, following literally the doctrine of ignorantia juris as
proclaimed by the maxim, have refused to accept ignorance, or
mistake, of law as a defense.8 If an element of law enter into the
the same effect see 2 Stephen, Hist. Grim. Law, 157, 161; Ray, Med. Jur. of Insan.,
283; article by Morton Prince, M.D., in 49 Jour. Amer. Med. Ass'n, 1643, 1645.
1 2 Stephen, Hist. Grim. Law, x61; Bishop, New Crim. Law, § 393.
2 "A man may be insane as to certain objects and on certain subjects and perfectly
sane with respect to other objects and on other subjects." Clark and Marshall, Grim.
Law, § 96. Also Harris, Crim. Law, 3 ed., 24; State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464; State v.
Mewherter, 46 Ia. 88, xoo. In Dew v. Clark, 3 Add. Ecc. 79, Sir John Nichol said
that the contention that the law of England never deems a party sane and insane at
the same time upon different subjects is incorrect. This view is approved in Buswell,
Insanity, § 15.
3 Ignorance of law was held no defense in these cases: Rex v. Bailey, R. & R. i;
Rex v. Esop, 7 C. & P. 456; Rex v. Crawshaw, i Bell C. C. 303; Barronet's Case, i E.
& B. i; Schuster v. State, 48 Ala. 199; Winehart v. State, 6 Ind. 30; Jellico Coal
Min. Co. v. Com., 96 Ky. 373; Grumbine v. State, 6o Md. 355; Com. v. Everson, 140
Mass. 292; Whitton v. State, 37 Miss. 379; State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528; State v.
Halsted, 39 N. J. L. 4o2; State v. Foster, 22 R. I. 163; Walker v. State, 2 Swan
(Tenn.) 287; Brig Ann, i Gall. (U. S.) 62; U. S. v. Fourteen Packages, Gilp. (U. S.)
235; The Joseph, 8 Cranch (U. S.) 451; Wilson v. The Brig Mary, Gilp. (U. S.) 31.
See notes 2 and 3 on p. 9o.
It has been suggested in several instances that ignorance of law may properly be
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mistake of defendant, such mistake is held to be no defense. There
is, however, an exception to this general rule. When a specific crim-
inal intent, as distinguished from the criminal mind, is a requisite
element of the offense, and such intent is negatived by ignorance
or mistake, it is held that the defendant shall not be convicted,
notwithstanding the maxim.1 Although the writer fully recognizes
that the courts enforce, and commentators approve, the general
doctrine that mistake of law is no defense, nevertheless, it is sug-
gested that on principle and analogy a different result may and
ground for pardon: Rex v. Bailey, R. & R. i; or for reducing sentence, Atkins v.
State, 95 Tenn. 474.
Mistake of law was no defense in the following: Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57;
Frasier v. State, 112 Ga. 13; Derixson v. State, 65 Ind. 385; Davis v. Com., 76 Ky.
318; State v. Whitcomb, 52 Ia. 85; Com. v. Bagley, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 279; Pisar v.
State, 56 Neb. 455; Hamilton v. People, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 625; Medrano v. State, 22
S. W. 684 (Tex.).
Ignorance or mistake of law due to the advice of a public officer is held to be no
defense. Wilson v. The Brig Mary, Gilp. (U. S.) 31; The Joseph, 8 Cranch (U. S.)
451 ; Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57; Hamilton v. People, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 625; State v.
Foster, 22 R. I. 163.
1 "If A thinking he have title to the horse of B seiseth it as his own this makes it
no felony but a trespass because there is a pretense of title." i Hale P. C. 5o8.
Larceny: Reg. v. Reed, i C. & M. 3o6; Reg. z. Wade, II Cox C. C. 549; Morning-
star v. State, 55 Ala. 148; State v. Bond, 8 Ia. 540; Com. v. Stebbins, 8 Gray (Mass.)
492; State v. Homes, i7 MO. 379; People v. Husband, 36 Mich. 3o6. Malicious tres-
pass: Palmer v. State, 45 Ind. 388; State v. Newkirk, 49 MO. 84; State v. Hanks, 66
N. C. 612; Com. v. Cole, 26 Pa. St. 187; Dye v. CoM., 7 Grat. (Va.) 662. Maliciously
setting fire to furze: Reg. v. Towse, 14 Cox C. C. 327. Malicious damage: Reg. v.
Matthews, 14 Cox C. C. 5; Reg. v. Croft, Ii C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 202; Reg. v. Langford,
i C. & M. 6o2; Goforth v. State, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 37. Robbery: Rex v. Hall, 3 C.
& P. 4o9; State v. Hollyway, 41 Ia. 2oo. Assault with intent to rob: Reg. v. Boden
i C. & K. 395. Embezzlement: Reg. v. Norman, i C. & M. 501; Beaty v. State, 82
Ind. 228; State v. Reilly, 4 Mo. App. 392. Maliciously secreting property: Hampton
v. State, io Lea (Tenn.) 639. Wilfully removing official seal: U. S. v. Three Rail-
road Cars, i Abb. U. S. 196. Perjury: Rex v. Crespigny, i Esp. 280; Hood v. State,
44Ala. 8t. Corruptly granting license: People v. Jones, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 3N. Felo-
niously taking deed from registry: Com. v. Weld, Thacher C. C. 157. Cutting, with
intent to remove, timber from government lands: U. S. v. Shuler, 6 McLean (U. S.)
28. Extortion (corrupt): State v. Porter, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 175; State v. Reeves, 15 Kan.
396; Com. v. Shed, i Mass. 227. Knowingly rejecting vote: Com. v. Lee, i Brewst.
(Pa.) 273. Knowingly receiving illegal vote: Byrne v. State, I2 Wis. 577.; State v.
McDonald, 4 Har 555. Fraudulent voting: Com. v. Algar, Thacher C. C. 412; CoM.
v. Bradford, 9 Met. (Mass.) 268; State v. Macomber, 7 R. L 349. Falsely acting as
public officer: Hall v. People, 21 Mich. 456. Knowingly erasing the name of a voter:
State v,. Smith, i8 N. H. 9r. Wilfully giving false answer at election: Reg. v. Dods-
worth, 8 C. & P. 218.
Contra; Malicious shooting: Rex v'. Bailey, R. & R. 1. Murder: Rex v,. Thomas,
East. T. I816, MS.; Weston v. Com., xix Pa. St. 251. Larceny: State v,. Welch, 73
Mo. 284. Fraudulent voting: State v. Boyett, io Ired. (N. C.) 336, 343, 344-
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should properly be reached in certain cases where a criminal act
is committed under a misconception of the law.
There are two classes of cases in which a man may act under a
misconception of the law. In the first he does an act in ignorance
that the law makes such act criminal. Here the misconception is
due to lack of knowledge, and may be termed "ignorance of law,"
as when a man already married marries again in ignorance that a
second marriage is unlawful. In the second case the defendant
does an act under a misconception of the legal effect of certain
facts; that is, he gets a wrong view of a situation as a result of the
improper application of law to facts. Here an act, neutral in itself,
becomes criminal by reason of some preceding situation or status.
Thus, when a man marries, the criminal character of the marriage
depends upon the question whether the man was already married.
Such a question, as already shown,' is a question of law, because
it deals with the application of law to facts. This second case
may be termed "mistake" as distinguished from "ignorance" of
law.
Under what has been termed "ignorance of law" may be grouped
two situations. The first is when a man does an act without giving
any attention to the law as such, in what may be termed uncon-
sciousness that the law governs such a case; 2 the second, when he
considers the law but believes that it does not govern the particular
case.3 In each instance he does an act in ignorance that the law
has made the act criminal.
It is the contention at this point that there is a distinction, so far
as legal effect is concerned, between the two classes of cases desig-
nated by the headings "ignorance of law" and "mistake of law."
This distinction is based upon the ground that ignorance of law does
not negative the criminal mind, whereas mistake of law does. When
a person, not insane, does an act, knowing its physical character, if
the act is criminal the doer of the act has the criminal mind. 4 In-
tending an act which the law has made criminal is the criminal mind.
This is so even when the defendant has not the means or oppor-
tunity of knowing that the law exists which makes his act crim-
inal, - for example, when the act was committed so short a time
after the passage of a statute that the defendant could not possibly
1 P. 77, inlfra.
2 Rex v. Esop, 7 C. & P. 456; Rex v. Crawshaw, i Bell C. C. 303.
8 Rex v. Soleguard, Andr. 231; Reg. v. Price, 3 P. & D. 421.
4 See p. 81, infra.
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have known of it.' The defendant has the criminal mind in such a
case.m 2 It follows that the reason why ignorance of the criminality
of the act does not excuse is that in such a case the defendant has
the criminal mind. The rule of law embraced in the language of
the maxim is the fundamental rule that criminality is determined
by the criminal mind.
It is a common statement that the rule concerning ignorance of
law exists apart from the general principles of criminal jurispru-
dence, and must rest upon policy alone.3 Policy, however, should
be invoked to support propositions of law only when these cannot
be explained by general principles. At best policy is vague, and
courts may well differ as to when it exists. It is also sometimes
said that ignorance of law will not excuse, because "every one is
presumed to know the law." 4 If this presumption can be taken
to mean that most persons do know the law, it is on its face ab-
surd.5 If it means that in this connection it is immaterial whether
one knows the law or not, it may be asked why this is so. The
only answer is, that despite the ignorance all the elements of crimi-
nality are present.
When, on the other hand, a person does an act under an erro-
neous idea of a situation reached by applying law to facts, if the
act done would not be criminal provided the situation were as he
believed it, the defendant should have a good defense. He is in
the same position, so far as his state of mind is concerned, as
though the situation regarding which he was mistaken were one
solely of fact. By applying the test which governs mistake of
fact the defendant in the above case does not have the criminal
mind.
The difference in legal effect between an act done in ignorance
of law, and an act due to a mistake of law, may be illustrated by
the following hypothetical cases. Suppose a statute making tres-
1 Brig Ann, i Gall. (U. S.) 62. See Oakland v. Carpentier, 21 Cal. 642, 665.
2 This result seems harsh, since the defendant was morally guiltless. The criminal
mind does not, however, embrace any idea of moral wrong. A defendant may be
guilty of a crime though his motive was morally commendable. Reg. v. Sharpe, 7 Cox
C. C. 214.
8 Austin, Jur., § 689; Holmes, Com. Law, 48; Wharton, Crim. Ev., § 723; Valen-
tine, J., in State v. Brown, 16 Pac. 259, 26o (Kan.).
4 1 Hale P. C. 42; 1 Hawkins P. C., Curwood's ed., 5, § 14, n.
6 "Now to affirm 'that every person may know the law' is to affirm what is not.
And to say 'that his ignorance should not excuse him because he is bound to know'
is simply to assign the rule as a reason for itself." Austin, Jur. § 669. See also
2 Stephen, Hist. Crim. Law, 114.
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pass upon land criminal. Under this statute the criminal mind
must be present in order to make the defendant culpable.' In the
first case A enters upon the land of B in ignorance that the statute
makes such entry unlawful. Here A would be guilty, as he has,
for the reasons already given, the criminal mind. In the second
case A believes that the title to certain land2 is in him, and he
enters upon the land, which, however, belongs to B. Here A
should not be convicted under the statute, because, supposing the
situation to be what he thought it, his act could not have ben
criminal.
In connection with the contention that the defendant no more
has the criminal mind when the situation, with reference to which
he acted, resulted from the application of law to facts than when
the situation was one of fact solely, suppose, as above, a statute
making trespass upon realty criminal. A and B own adjoining
estates. Through each estate a private road leads from the high-
way to the owner's house. A while driving along the public road
determines to turn into his own lane, but by mistake turns into
the lane of B. In the second case A goes into a certain field
which he thinks belongs to him, but the title is in B. There
clearly could be no conviction of A in the first case, as he acted
under a mistake of fact which negatived the existence of the crimi-
nal mind. The mental attitude of the defendant in the second
case was the same as in the first case. Hence he should have a
defense in the second case.
Another case may well be considered. It is a recognized rule
of law that a man cannot as principal commit rape upon his wife.
A man by force has intercourse with a woman whom he believes
to be his wife. The woman is not his wife, but resembles her in
appearance. Another man, believing by reason of having gone
through a marriage ceremony that a woman is his wife, has inter-
course with her without her consent. It develops later that the
ceremony of marriage was illegal, and the woman was not his
wife. In each case the defendant committed the act believing the
woman to be his wife; and if his belief had been correct, his act
would have been no crime. In the first case the mistake was one
of fact, while in the second the mistake was one of law. It does
not seem right to convict the defendant in the second case and
1 Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. x68.
2 Title is determined by applying law to facts.
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acquit him in the first. His mental attitude was the same in
each case.'
In the following cases, where the criminal mind, as distinguished
from a specific intent, was negatived by a mistake of law as above
defined, the courts, though perhaps not conscious of the signifi-
cance of such a view, held that the defendant had a good defense.
Rex v. Forbes, 2 1835. The defendant was indicted for forging
P's name as acceptor of a bill of exchange. The defendant
offered as a defense that he believed he had the authority to
use P's name for that purpose. Coleridge, J., instructed the jury,
that if the defendant bona fide believed that he had the authority
to sign P's name to the bill there was no forgery.8
Regina v. Allday,4 1837. In this case the defendant was in-
dicted under a statute which made it a felony to write some matter
or thing, liable to stamp duty, on paper on which previously some
other matter liable to stamp duty had been written, before the
paper had been again stamped. The defendant, who was author,
ized to issue licenses for the letting of post-horses, changed the
date of a license and the term for which it was to run, under a
mistake as to his rights in the matter. Lord Abinger instructed
the jury: " It is a maxim older than the law of England, that a
man is not guilty unless his mind be guilty. If a person through
mistake thought he could alter this license, and send the 7s. 6d. to
Somerset House, that would be no felony in law any more than it
would be in reason, justice or common sense."
In Dotson v. State, ,I 869, where there was a prosecution under
a statute, which made it an offense for any one to trespass upon an-
other's land by cutting down timber with a view to converting the
same to his own use, the following dictum appears: "If one commit
a trespass upon the land of another, his good faith in the matter or
ignorance of the true right or title will not exonerate him from
1 "Where is the distinction between the mistake of fact which induces a woman to
consent to intercourse with a man supposed to be sound in body, but not really so,
and the mistake of fact which induces her to consent to intercourse with a man whom
she believes to be her lawful husband, but who is none?" Wills, J., in Reg. v. Clar-
ence, 16 Cox C. C. 511. The second mistake is clearly one of law, though called mis-
take of fact.
2 7 C. & P. 22.
3 Reg. v. Parish, 8 C. & P. 94 and Reg. v. Beard, 8 C. & P. 143, are similar cases,
in which the court instructed the jury as in Rex v. Forbes.
4 8 C. & P. 136.
5 6 Cold. ITenn.) .
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civil responsibility for the act. But when the statute affixes to
such a trespass the consequences of a criminal offense, we will not
presume that the Legislature intended to punish criminally acts
committed in ignorance, by accident, or under claim of right, and in
the bona fide belief that the land is the property of the trespasser,
unless the terms of the statute forbid any such construction."
In Cutter v. State,' 1873, the defendant, a justice of the peace,
was indicted under a statute which provided that "if any justice,
etc., shall receive or take by color of his office, any fee or reward
whatsoever, not allowed by the laws of this state, he shall be pun-
ished, etc." By way of defense the defendant showed that he
took the money innocently believing that legally he had a right
to the money taken. The court held that to secure a conviction
under this statute a criminal mind was necessary, and that this was
negatived by the defendant's mistake
2
Squire v. State,8 1874. This was a prosecution for bigamy,
The defendant married a second time under the mistaken belief
that his former wife had been divorced. The jury convicted the
defendant. The court above held there should be a new trial
and said inter alia: "We think the court should have charged
the jury, if it had been so asked, that if they believed from the
evidence that the defendant had been informed that his wife had
been divorced and that he had used due care and made due
inquiry to ascertain the truth, and had, considering all the cir-
cumstances, reason to believe, and did believe, at the time of his
second marriage, that his former wife had been divorced from him,
they should find him not guilty."
State v. Goodenow 4 is a case commonly cited for the proposition
that a mistake of law is no defense. In this case a man and
woman were jointly indicted for adultery. They had cohabited
as husband and wife while the woman was married to another
man. The defendants contended that they should not be pun-
ished because they had no criminal mind, and offered evidence
that the woman's first husband had married again, and that the
justice of the peace who married the defendants told them that
1 36N. J.L. 125.
2 The court discusses (p. 127) a case in which a specific intent is made a "neces-
sary constituent of the offense," and seems at this point to regard the 
principal case
as being of this character. An examination of the statute in question reveals 
the fact
that no such intent was made a part of the offense created by the statute.
8 46 Ind. 459.
4 65 Me. 30.
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this marriage of the husband left the wife free to marry again,
and the defendants believed this statement to be true. This
evidence was rejected. The court above held such rejection
proper. The decision, however, was not based upon the ground
that the defendants' mistake as to their legal position could be
no defense, but upon the ground that they were negligent. This
is clearly shown by the following extract from the opinion: "There
is no doubt that a person might commit an unlawful act, through
mistake or accident, and with innocent intention, when there was
no negligence or fault or want of care of any kind on his part, and
be legally excused for it. But this case was far from one of that
kind. Here it was criminal heedlessness on the part of both of the
respondents to do what was done by them." It will be thus seen,
that this case instead of being an authority against the present con-
tention is in accord with it. The decision has been greatly misunder-
stood and it has been held on the supposed authority of this case
that a similar mistake was no excuse in cases where there was no
negligence.'
In civil actions the distinction is recognized between a case in
which an act is done without knowledge of the law governing that
act, and a case in which an act is done under a wrong impression
of a former situation produced by applying law to facts.2
It may be objected, that to make a distinction between the terms
"ignorance" and "mistake" of law, as has been above attempted, is
mere sophistry and for this reason should not be approved. Even if
this be granted, it is still submitted that the legal conclusion con-
tended for should be recognized. Where the defendant errs in ap-
plying law to facts, thus reaching an incorrect conclusion, and then
does an act which would not have been criminal if the conclusion
were correct, he should not be convicted, because he does not have
the guilty mind. Such an error may be said to be a "mistake of
I State v. Whitcomb, 52 Ia. 85. See also Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57.
2 " Whenever a person is ignorant or mistaken with respect to his own antecedent
and existing private legal rights, interests, estates, duties, liabilities or other relation
either of property or contract or legal status, and enters into some transaction the legal
scope and operation of which he correctly apprehends and understands for the purpose
of affecting such assumed rights, interests, or relations, or of carrying out such assumedduties or liabilities, equity will grant its relief, defensive or affirmative, treating the
mistake as analogous to, if not identical with, a mistake of fact." Pomeroy, Eq.
Jur., § 849.
8 If the mistake fails to negative the criminal mind, for the reasons considered
under mistake of fact, or because the defendant was negligent, his mistake should be
no defense.
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mixed law and fact"; I or, it may be called a "mistake of fact"; 2 or,
it may be stated that when an element of fact enters into the error
there can be no conviction, if the criminal mind is negatived; or, it
may be said that there should be a defense when a mistake is made
concerning a private right as distinguished from a rule of law; 8 or,
finally, the error may be named "mistake of law" as defined in this
article. The phraseology is immaterial. Nevertheless, it is urged
that there is a real distinction between such a case and one in
which a criminal act is committed with full knowledge of the
circumstances, but in ignorance that the act is criminal. It is
further urged that this distinction rests upon fundamental principles
of criminal jurisprudence.
Edwin R. Keedy.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY.
I Bishop, New Crim. Law, § 311. In State v. Castle, 44 Wis. 670, 684, where the
defendant mistakenly believed that a certain road was not a highway, Ryan, C. J., said
that the validity of the highway was a mixed question of law and fact.
2 See Pomeroy, Eq. Jur., § 849. See quotation from opinion of Wills, J., in Reg.
v. Clarence, 16 Cox C. C. 511 in note on p. 93, infra.
3 Kerr, Fraud and Mistake, 398.
